Emphasis on “liberal” in when I say “decent Chinese liberal analysis”, because the author is still using a binary leftist/conservatism against “reformist”/liberal mindset throughout the paper. This same mindset is shared by ultra-lefts, or left-deviationists, so really these are two extremes in ideology.

In China, reformers include both those who seek to get rid of the Chinese Communist Party and make the country a liberal democracy, as well as those who believe in the necessity of economic marketization, opening up to the outside world, and allowing some limited political reform that falls short of challenging the party’s supremacy. Conservatives oppose a market economy and political liberalization, usually in the name of safeguarding socialist orthodoxy, i.e., an economic system based on public ownership of property or economic assets, class struggle, and the party’s absolute control. In this paper, China’s conservatives are also interchangeably referred to as “leftists,” whereas the reformers are usually regarded as being on the right side of China’s ideological spectrum.

This binary categorization is why the author concludes that leftists won over reformists and China is now going down the path of “Maoist conservatism”. The author is unable to deal with dialectics as he views the following as policy contradictions:

First, if Xi was empowered by an elite consensus, what explains the policy contradictions during his early years in power? The party called for deepening marketization while further empowering the state-owned enterprises. It also advocated the rule of law while at the same time emphasizing the party’s unrestrained leadership and tightening up political control. In short, conservative and reformist policies coexisted in a confusing way. Such confusion raises the question of whether there was a unified collective patron who entrusted power to Xi.

My view is that Deng’s reforms and thus Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is socialist reform at its core, and ideological struggles within the party are not class struggles (socialism vs capitalism), they are instead debates on how to develop socialism. Mao vs Deng is a false antagonism, Mao was never ultra-left, as much as ultras and liberals wished he was. The “complication” with China’s politics as viewed by outsiders arises because they tend to associate certain tools with certain ideologies, like linking markets to capitalism, linking government planning and regulation with socialism. All confusion surrounding China’s politics comes from a lack of dialectical thinking.

I wouldn’t call this “western academia”, because the author’s name is “Lin Le”, an unambiguous Chinese name that suggests a mainland China education background. The fact that the author provides hundreds of references to Chinese articles, and is aware of nuanced political language is also evidence of this.

Thus I would say that this is a decent Chinese liberal analysis of Chinese politics, that goes beyond simple factionalism-based analysis.

Why hasn’t China cut ties with the US or Japan, why did China build diplomatic relations with them in the first place back in 1972? Why does China not have diplomatic relations with countries that “recognize” Taiwan province as an “independent country”, but still maintain ties with a genocidal Israel? Why hasn’t Russia cut ties with the US?

What does it mean to cut ties, for all official communication between two governments to stop? For all trade between two countries to stop? Cutting ties will not stop Israel from continuing its war crimes. I think China wants to be more of a mediator between Israel and Palestine as it supports a two-state solution, so cutting ties with any side will work against that.

According to this Wikipedia page:

As of 28 May 2024, 145 of the 193 United Nations (UN) member states officially recognize the State of Palestine (Israel is recognized by 165).